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Arkansas Open Carry: Understanding Law
Enforcement’s Legal Capability Under a
Difficult Statute
∗

I. INTRODUCTION
“There seems to us no doubt, on the basis of both text and
history, that the Second Amendment conferred an individual
right to keep and bear arms.”1 Although the United States
Supreme Court in District of Columbia v. Heller established a
fundamental understanding that individuals have a right to own
a gun for personal use, the Court recognized that, as with all
fundamental rights, the individual right to keep and bear arms is
“not unlimited.”2 A few limits the Court mentioned included
“prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the
mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in
sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or
laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial
sale of arms.”3 Naturally, the Heller decision left us with this
question: What are the constitutionally sound restrictions, and
how far can the government go?4
The revised Arkansas Carrying a Weapon Statute (Open
Carry Statute)5 implicates this very question that Heller left
undecided. In 2013, the Open Carry Statute was revised by the
Arkansas legislature, through the passage of Act 746, to read:
The author sincerely thanks Carlton Bailey, Professor of Law, University of
Arkansas School of Law, for his generous time and helpful comments throughout the
drafting of this comment. The author also thanks Laurent Sacharoff, Associate Professor of
Law, University of Arkansas School of Law, for his assistance in the selection and crafting
of this topic. The author finally thanks his parents and siblings for their unwavering support
and encouragement in all endeavors.
1. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 595 (2008).
2. Id. at 595.
3. Id. at 626-27.
4. Adam Liptak, Coming Next, Court Fights on Guns in Cities, N.Y. TIMES, June 27,
2008,
at
A1,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/27/washington/27guns.html?_r=0
[https://perma.cc/D3XX-4T2P].
5. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-73-120 (2015).
∗
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A person commits the offense of carrying a weapon if he or
she possesses a handgun, knife, or club on or about his or
her person, in a vehicle occupied by him or her, or
otherwise readily available for use with a purpose to
attempt to unlawfully employ the handgun, knife, or club as
a weapon against a person.6

By reading the plain meaning of the statute, it seems that
“[i]t is now illegal to possess a handgun only if the person has
the ‘purpose’ to use it ‘unlawfully’ against a person.”7 Although
the history of this Arkansas criminal statute tends to show that
the legalization of openly carrying firearms may not have been
the true intention of the legislature,8 it is anticipated that the
court will be bound by the rule of lenity.9
The rule of lenity is a legal doctrine that requires penal
statutes to “be construed to reach the most lenient interpretation
from the defendant’s standpoint.”10 In cases involving an
ambiguous statute, such as the Arkansas Open Carry Statute, the
court will be bound to “strictly” construe the penal statute and
resolve all doubts in favor of the defendant.11 Because the rule
of lenity will likely apply, the practical consequence is that
Arkansas’s Open Carry Statute likely legalizes the possession of
a firearm in public view so long as the possessor does not have
an intention to use the gun unlawfully against another.12 The
most recent non-binding Attorney General opinion on this issue
took this same interpretation and many law enforcement
departments across the state are handling the situation

6. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-73-120(a) (2015).
7. Laurent Sacharoff & Jacob Worlow, Open Carry in Arkansas—An Ambiguous
Statute,
2014
ARK.
L.
NOTES
1548
(2014),
http://media.law.uark.edu/arklawnotes/2014/02/13/open-carry-in-arkansas-an-ambiguousstatute/ [https://perma.cc/3GBP-CMZF].
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Michael W. Mullane, Statutory Interpretation in Arkansas: How Arkansas
Courts Interpret Statutes. A Rational Approach, 2005 ARK. L. NOTES 405 (2005),
http://media.law.uark.edu/arklawnotes/files/2011/03/Mullane-Statutory-Interpretation-inArkansas-Arkansas-Law-Notes-2005.pdf [https://perma.cc/V453-5S4K].
11. Williams v. State, 364 Ark. 203, 208, 217 S.W.3d 817, 819 (2005).
12. Sacharoff & Worlow, supra note 7.
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accordingly.13 However, the complete lack of any judicial or
legislative guidance on what exactly the revisions in the statute
mean has led to much debate, even resulting in contradicting
attorneys general opinions.14
Although the statute has clearly sparked confusion
throughout the state on exactly how people may carry their guns
in public,15 the variety of issues raised by this statute do not stop
at simple statutory interpretation. The real concerns that stem
from this statute deeply coincide with law enforcement’s legal
capability regarding this law, and most importantly, how this
capability impacts Arkansas citizens who choose to openly carry
their firearms.
Because a plain meaning interpretation and the rule of
lenity likely permit the open carry of firearms under the
Arkansas Open Carry Statute, the Arkansas General Assembly
must provide clarification in order to ensure proper protection
under the Fourth Amendment. This comment will focus on the
issues relating to this ambiguous statute, and it will provide
some clarity on law enforcement’s legal capability when dealing
with the Arkansas Carrying a Weapon Statute. Furthermore, the
problems and concerns with leaving this statute in the present
legal climate, especially given the broad legal discretion of law
enforcement, will be addressed. Finally, this article provides
some suggestions for the Arkansas General Assembly to revise
the statute and, therefore, diminish the concerns exemplified by
the current open carry legislation.

13. See Ark. Op. Att’y Gen. No. 2015-064 (Aug. 28, 2015); see also Telephone
Interview with Scott Young, Lieutenant, Wash. Cty. Sheriff’s Office (Oct. 20, 2015);
Telephone Interview with Lieutenant Si, Benton Cty. Sheriff’s Office (Oct. 20, 2015);
Telephone Interview with Greg Downs, Gen. Counsel, Ark. State Police (Oct. 20, 2015);
Sacharoff & Worlow, supra note 7.
14. Compare Ark. Op. Att’y Gen. No. 2015-064 (Aug. 28, 2015) (addressing the
effects of Act 746 and advising that a person may carry a handgun legally so long as they
do not have the intent to attempt unlawful employment of the handgun), with Ark. Op.
Att’y Gen. No. 2013-47 (July 8, 2013) (advising that Act 746 should not be interpreted to
authorize “open-carry”).
15. See Melanie Buck, Open Carry Debate Continues, MYPULSENEWS.COM (July 1,
2015), http://mypulsenews.com/open-carry-debate-continues/ [https://perma.cc/96YMBKRC].
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II. REQUIREMENTS UNDER THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT
The Fourth Amendment protects the right of all citizens to
be free from unreasonable searches and seizures by the
government.16 The touchstone of analysis under the Fourth
Amendment is always “the reasonableness in all the
circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of a
citizen’s personal security.”17 Reasonableness depends “on a
balance between the public interest and the individual’s right to
personal security free from arbitrary interference by law
officers.”18 The Fourth Amendment applies to seizures of a
person, including seizures that are substantially shorter when
compared to traditional arrests.19
“While the Court has
recognized that in some circumstances a person may be detained
briefly, without probable cause to arrest him,” the Fourth
Amendment requires officers to have “at least [] a reasonable
and articulable suspicion that the person seized is engaged in
criminal activity” before they may constitutionally engage in
“any curtailment of a person’s liberty.”20 The totality of the
circumstances—“the whole picture”—must be taken into
account in determining if an officer has developed this founded
suspicion.21

III. THE PROBLEMATIC INTERACTION
SCENARIOS BETWEEN LAW ENFORCEMENT AND
INDIVIDUALS
To effectively understand law enforcement’s legal
capability under the statute and, in turn, the concerns of this
article, it is important to address the types of police-citizen
encounters this statute implicates.
The established law
16. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
17. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968).
18. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975).
19. Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 440 (1980); see also Terry, 392 U.S. at 16, 19.
20. Reid, 448 U.S. at 440; see also Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661 (1979);
Brignoni-Ponce, 442 U.S. at 878.
21. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981); see also Brown v. Texas, 443
U.S. 47, 51 (1979); Brignoni-Ponce, 442 U.S. at 884.
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governing these interactions gives a thorough basis for realizing
the concerns this statute creates.
The Supreme Court has consistently held that in situations
where it is impractical for an officer to obtain advance judicial
approval of searches and seizures through the warrant process,
the officer’s intrusion “must be tested by the Fourth
Amendment’s general proscription against unreasonable
searches and seizures.”22 Arkansas has adopted the Supreme
Court’s construction of the types of searches and seizures that
result from these “street” police-citizen interactions,23 which
generally fall into these categories: (1) the officer develops a
reasonable suspicion to conduct a limited search for weapons
that might be used to assault him, the Terry stop and frisk
scenario;24 (2) a consensual officer-citizen encounter;25 (3) the
officer develops probable cause that a crime has been
committed, the search incident to arrest scenario;26 (4) a routine
traffic stop;27 (5) police engaging in community caretaking
functions;28 and (6) the officer has a reasonable belief there may
be weapons in a car with a dangerous suspect.29 Although it is
possible that all of these scenarios could implicate the Arkansas
Open Carry Statute, the two types of encounters that create the
true concerns of this article include Terry stop and frisks and
consensual encounters because of law enforcement’s capability
to search individuals based solely on the low threshold standard
of reasonable suspicion.

22. Terry, 392 U.S. at 20.
23. Jefferson v. State, 349 Ark. 236, 244, 76 S.W.3d 850, 854-55 (2002); Thompson
v. State, 303 Ark. 407, 409-10, 797 S.W.2d 450, 451-52 (1990).
24. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 30.
25. See Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 431 (1991).
26. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392-98 (1914); see also United States
v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 227 (1973).
27. See Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 333-34 (1977).
28. See, e.g., Illinois v. Lister, 540 U.S. 419, 424-25 (2004) (holding that police
handing out flyers was not to determine whether individuals were committing a crime, but
rather to ask vehicle occupants for their help in providing information about a crime that
was likely committed by others, and therefore is held to different, less demanding,
constitutional standards).
29. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1035, 1054 (1983).
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The third interaction scenario, the search incident to arrest
scenario, requires a substantially higher evidentiary standard
than Terry stops or consensual encounters: that of probable
cause.30 Through a line of cases, the Supreme Court has
determined when and how the search incident to arrest exception
to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment applies.31
When officers establish probable cause that a crime has been
committed, they are permitted to conduct a search of the person
and their vehicle “when the arrestee is unsecured and within
reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of
the search” or if there is a likelihood of discovering offense
related evidence in the vehicle,32 without a warrant.33 Some
jurisdictions, such as Arkansas, allow this search incident to
arrest exception to extend outside of the vehicle context to the
immediate surroundings of the accused.34 This higher standard
of probable cause as well as the specifically delineated
circumstances for searches incident to arrest sufficiently protect
individuals from arbitrary or minimally justified searches that
the current Open Carry Statute seems to encourage.
In addition, routine traffic stops and car searches will
implicate the Open Carry Statute when officers lawfully pull a
vehicle over and the individual is openly carrying a firearm.
However, in these instances, the officer’s interactions are
controlled by the same foundational principles commanded by
Terry.35
30. See Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235.
31. See Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 341, 351 (2009); Thornton v. United States,
541 U.S. 615, 623-24 (2004); New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981); Robinson,
414 U.S. at 224; Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969). Arkansas has adopted
a similar construction of the United States Supreme Court search incident to arrest
exception through ARK. R. CRIM. P. 12.4.
32. Gant, 556 U.S. at 343-44.
33. Angad Singh, Stepping Out of the Vehicle: The Potential of Arizona v. Gant to
End Automatic Searches Incident to Arrest Beyond the Vehicular Context, 59 AM. U. L.
REV. 1759, 1770, 1775, 1780 (2010); see also Gant, 556 U.S. at 351; Belton, 453 U.S. at
462-63; Robinson, 414 U.S. at 218; Chimel, 395 U.S. at 768.
34. See ARK. R. CRIM. P. 12.5; see also Sean Foley, The Newly Murky World of
Searches Incident to Lawful Arrest: Why the Gant Restrictions Should Apply to All
Searches Incident to Arrest, 61 U. KAN. L. REV. 753, 767-80 (2013).
35. The Supreme Court has held that when an officer legally stops a driver they may
order the driver out of the car without further justification. Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434
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The “special needs” or “community caretaking” exceptions
are specifically delineated police activities that the Supreme
Court has come to recognize as distinctive from ordinary law
enforcement activities.36 These searches and seizures come
within the “special needs” category when a perceived need
makes the warrant requirement or development of probable
cause impractical.37 Although these are functions and activities
of law enforcement that could potentially implicate the Open
Carry Statute, this area of law is still developing and more
closely resembles other government activities that invade the
privacy interests of citizens, such as administrative and border
searches, rather than ordinary criminal law enforcement.38 As
such, these non-criminal law enforcement interactions are not
directly applicable to the main concerns of this article and will
not be specifically addressed.

U.S. 106, 111 (1977). Furthermore, the officer may legally order the passenger out of the
car. Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 414-15 (1997). In these circumstances, the officer
is still bound by the requirements of the Fourth Amendment, and any decision by the
officer relating to a search of the individual will demand a Terry analysis. See Thomas K.
Clancy, Protective Searches, Pat-Downs, or Frisks?: The Scope of the Permissible
Intrusion to Ascertain if a Detained Person Is Armed, 82 MARQ. L. REV. 491, 491-92
(1999).
36. See Mary Elizabeth Naumann, The Community Caretaker Doctrine: Yet Another
Fourth Amendment Exception, 26 AM. J. CRIM. L. 325, 326-27 (1999); see also William J.
Stuntz, Implicit Bargains, Government Power, and the Fourth Amendment, 44 STAN. L.
REV. 553, 553-56 (1992).
37. JOSHUA DRESSLER & GEORGE C. THOMAS, III, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:
INVESTIGATING CRIME 469-73 (6th ed. 2017). For a discussion on the limitations and legal
requirements for officers undertaking community caretaking functions, see Michael R.
Dimino, Sr., Police Paternalism: Community Caretaking, Assistance Searches, and Fourth
Amendment Reasonableness, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1485, 1518, 1528-30 (2009).
38. For examples of distinct police activities that are distinguished from ordinary law
enforcement activities, see Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 401-02 (2006)
(police rendering emergency aid); Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 422 (2004) (police
handing out flyers); Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 444 (1990) (highway
sobriety checkpoints); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 327, 347-48 (1985) (searches
by public school officials); United States v. Ramsay, 431 U.S. 606, 616, 623-25 (1977)
(border searches); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 365 (1976) (inventory
searches); Camara v. Mun. Ct., 387 U.S. 523, 525 (1967) (administrative searches).
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A. Terry Stop and Frisk
Of the two types of encounters that create the immediate
concerns surrounding this statute, the Terry stop and frisk
encounter is an appropriate starting point for determining how
law enforcement officers will handle police-citizen interactions
involving the open carrying of firearms in Arkansas. The
established principles of the Terry stop and frisk scenario
provide law enforcement officers with great discretion to stop
and frisk citizens even when there is no real reason to suspect
any involvement in a crime,39 and it is this discretion that
potentially implicates Fourth Amendment concerns stemming
from the Open Carry Statute. Indeed, a great deal of confusion
related to this statute revolves around these very encounters.40
In the landmark case of Terry v. Ohio, the High Court held
that when a police officer observes unusual conduct that leads
them reasonably to conclude that an individual may be armed
and presently dangerous, they are entitled to conduct a frisk
search of that individual for weapons.41 This holding defined
when, and more importantly why, officers can conduct a patdown search of individuals whom they encounter on a daily
basis on the streets.42 The Court’s reasoning was based on
officer safety.43 However, in practice, it has established itself as
an effective tool for law enforcement in their investigations.44
39. See Frank Rudy Cooper, The Un-Balanced Fourth Amendment: A Cultural Study
of the Drug War, Racial Profiling and Arvizu, 47 VILL. L. REV. 851, 884-86 (2002); see
also David A. Harris, Particularized Suspicion, Categorical Judgments: Supreme Court
Rhetoric Versus Lower Court Reality Under Terry v. Ohio, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 975,
977, 986, 1021 (1998) [hereinafter Harris, Particularized Suspicion]; David A. Harris,
Frisking Every Suspect: The Withering of Terry, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 5, (1994)
[hereinafter Harris, Frisking Every Suspect].
40. See Laurent A. Sacharoff, Editorial, Complex Question: Gun Law’s Meaning
Complicated, ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE, Sept. 12, 2015, at 33; see also Laura
Monteverdi, Clarifying the Open Carry Law in Arkansas, KTHV
(June
5,
2015,
11:25
AM),
http://legacy.thv11.com/story/news/local/2015/06/04/clarifying-the-open-carry-law-inarkansas/28504357/ [https://perma.cc/92GE-QYBY].
41. 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968).
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. See Daniel C. Isaacs, Miranda’s Application to the Expanding Terry Stop, 18
J.L. & POL’Y 383, 387-93 (2009).
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Of course, these Terry frisks always implicate the individual’s
Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches
and seizures because even though brief, they are still considered
a constitutional “search” and “seizure.”45 The Terry decision
determined that when officers develop a reasonable suspicion
that the individual is armed and presently dangerous, then a
“carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons”
is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.46
The permissible degree of intrusion allowed during a Terry
stop has greatly expanded since the Supreme Court decision in
1968.47 Courts have consistently departed from the “carefully
limited search of the outer clothing,”48 as the trend towards
granting officers “greater latitude in using force in order to
‘neutralize’ potentially dangerous suspects during an
investigation detention” has become the norm.49 In effect, since
Terry, the Supreme Court has expanded the permissible reasons
for the stop as well as the scope of the intrusion for police
officers.50
In this state, reasonable suspicion is specifically defined in
the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure:
[A] suspicion based on facts or circumstances which of
themselves do not give rise to the probable cause requisite
to justify a lawful arrest, but which give rise to more than a
bare suspicion; that is, a suspicion that is reasonable as
opposed to an imaginary or purely conjectural suspicion.51

The Arkansas legislature has defined the factors to be
considered in determining if a police officer has grounds to

45. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 30.
46. Id.
47. See Isaacs, supra note 44, at 387; see also United States v. Chaidez, 919 F.2d
1193, 1198 (7th Cir. 1990).
48. Terry, 392 U.S. at 30.
49. See Isaacs, supra note 44, at 393.
50. See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497-500 (1983); see also Isaacs, supra note
44, at 387-93.
51. ARK. R. CRIM. P. 2.1.
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reasonably suspect an individual.52 There are many factors that
are considered:
(1) The demeanor of the suspect;
(2) The gait and manner of the suspect;
(3) Any knowledge the officer may have of the suspect’s
background or character;
(4) Whether the suspect is carrying anything, and what he
or she is carrying;
(5) The manner in which the suspect is dressed, including
bulges in clothing, when considered in light of all of the
other factors;
(6) The time of the day or night the suspect is observed;
(7) Any overheard conversation of the suspect;
(8) The particular streets and areas involved;
(9) Any information received from third persons, whether
they are known or unknown;
(10) Whether the suspect is consorting with others whose
conduct is reasonably suspect;
(11) The suspect’s proximity to known criminal conduct;
(12) The incidence of crime in the immediate
neighborhood;
(13) The suspect’s apparent effort to conceal an article; and
(14) The apparent effort of the suspect to avoid
identification or confrontation by a law enforcement
officer.53

In viewing this list, it becomes quickly apparent that almost
everything is taken into account when determining reasonable
suspicion. The Arkansas Supreme Court has further clarified
that this list is not exhaustive.54 An officer can rely on things
that seem completely innocent in nature. For example, the
officer can rely on the gait and manner of the person, the
particular streets and areas involved, or—of particular
importance to the Arkansas Open Carry Statute—whether the
suspect is carrying anything.55 This establishes the initial
concern with the revised statute. Does the simple fact that the
52.
53.
54.
55.

See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-81-203 (West 2016).
ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-81-203.
Laime v. State, 60 S.W.3d 464, 473 (Ark. 2001).
ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-81-203.
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suspect is openly carrying a firearm establish a reasonable
suspicion that he is engaged in criminal activity?
Of course, the answer depends on whether the statute
effectively legalizes open carry in public. If these recent textual
changes do not allow for open carry—as Dustin McDaniel, the
previous Attorney General, interpreted the statute—then the
answer is clearly yes because openly carrying individuals would
simply be in violation of the statute itself. Officers who view
individuals openly carrying firearms would have probable cause,
a substantially higher standard than reasonable suspicion, that
such person was in violation of the Carrying a Weapon statute.
However, if Arkansas is now an open carry state (which
appears to be the case with the current statute)56 then this fact
alone should not be sufficient to establish a reasonable
suspicion. In states where possession of an unconcealed firearm
is legal, the mere observation or report of an unconcealed
firearm cannot, without more, create reasonable suspicion for a
Terry stop.57 However, because the recent textual changes of
this statute are ambiguous, there is concern throughout the state
of what standard of suspicion officers develop, or must develop,
when dealing with openly carrying citizens.
Furthermore, if officers do develop a reasonable suspicion
that the individual is in violation of the Carrying a Weapon
statute, is this enough to seize and search the individual?
Arkansas has developed its own rule for when a detention
without an arrest may transpire. This rule states:
A law enforcement officer lawfully present in any place
may, in the performance of his duties, stop and detain any
person who he reasonably suspects is committing, has
committed, or is about to commit (1) a felony, or (2) a
56. See infra Part III.A-B.
57. See Northrup v. City of Toledo Police Dep’t, 785 F.3d 1128, 1131-33 (6th Cir.
2015); United States v. Black, 707 F.3d 531, 540 (4th Cir. 2013); United States v. Lewis,
672 F.3d 232, 240 (3d Cir. 2012); United States v. Ubiles, 224 F.3d 213, 217-18 (3d. Cir.
2000); St. John v. McColley, 653 F. Supp. 2d 1155, 1161-63 (D.N.M. 2009); United States
v. Dudley, 854 F. Supp. 570, 579-80 (S.D. Ind. 1994); Pulley v. Commonwealth, 481
S.W.3d 520, 526-27 (Ky. Ct. App. 2016); State v. Williamson, 368 S.W.3d 468, 480-81
(Tenn. 2012). But see infra Part IV.B (arguing in actual practice it may be enough to
search the individual).
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misdemeanor involving danger of forcible injury to persons
or of appropriation of or damage to property, if such action
is reasonably necessary either to obtain or verify the
identification of the person or to determine the lawfulness
of his conduct. An officer acting under this rule may
require the person to remain in or near such place in the
officer’s presence for a period of not more than fifteen (15)
minutes or for such time as is reasonable under the
circumstances. At the end of such period the person
detained shall be released without further restraint, or
arrested and charged with an offense.58

This rule precisely clarifies that the officer’s reasonable
suspicion that the individual is engaged in criminal activity
“must be tied to commission of a felony or a misdemeanor
involving forcible injury to persons or property.”59 Violation of
the Open Carry Statute is a Class-A misdemeanor.60 For an
officer to stop and detain any person they suspect of committing
a misdemeanor, the crime itself must involve “danger of forcible
injury to persons.”61 Of course, the Open Carry Statute
addresses the danger of forcible injury to persons, namely by
including the mens rea or mental state requirement of the action
being done “with a purpose to attempt to unlawfully employ the
handgun . . . as a weapon against a person.”62 Therefore, when
a police officer investigates an individual openly carrying a
firearm and develops a reasonable suspicion that the individual
is violating the Open Carry Statute—by determining that they
have an intent to employ the weapon unlawfully—it would be
reasonable to stop and detain the individual. This strict
connection requiring the officer’s development of reasonable
suspicion to the commission of this particular crime essentially
mandates that the officer’s investigation revolve around the
intent of the individual. Proving intent is, of course, “inherently

58. ARK. R. CRIM. P. 3.1.
59. ARK. R. CRIM. P. 3.1; see also Laime v. State, 347 Ark. 142, 154-55, 60 S.W.3d.
464, 473 (2001).
60. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-73-120(d) (West 2013).
61. ARK. R. CRIM. P. 3.1.
62. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-73-120(a) (West 2015).
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difficult” and generally requires circumstantial evidence to
prove.63
Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.4 provides that if
the officer has detained an individual under Rule 3.1, they may
search “the immediate surroundings for, and seize, any weapon
or other dangerous thing which may be used against the officer
or others.”64 When dealing with the Open Carry Statute, this
allows the officer to seize the firearm and search the immediate
surroundings at the moment they develop reasonable suspicion
that the statute has been violated. Naturally, without definitively
knowing whether openly carrying itself develops this reasonable
suspicion, officers and citizens alike are unsure how this applies
to the current form of the statute. Again, the ambiguity makes it
difficult to determine how these legal standards should
theoretically play out in these police-citizen interactions.
Many of the interactions that law enforcement officers will
have with openly carrying individuals will be sparked by
anonymous tips from citizens within the community.65 The
natural question of consequence is how do these anonymous tips
fit into the “totality of the circumstances” when developing a
reasonable suspicion to briefly detain and search such
individuals? The Supreme Court has established that the
reliability of the anonymous tipster is the focal point of this
inquiry.
In Florida v. JL, the Supreme Court decided “whether an
anonymous tip that a person is carrying a gun is, without more,
sufficient to justify a police officer’s stop and frisk of that
person.”66 In JL, “an anonymous caller reported to the Miami63. See Chad S.C. Stover, Best Practices in Proving Specific Intent and Malice.
What Can Civil and Criminal Litigators Learn from One Another?, ABA SEC. LITIG., at 1,
5
(2014),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/litigation/materials/2014_sac/
2014_sac/best_practices.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/S8ND-784G].
64. ARK. R. CRIM. P. 3.4.
65. See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, The Volokh Conspiracy: The Fourth Amendment and
Open Carry (Where Such Open Carry Is Legal), WASH. POST (May 13, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/05/13/the-fourthamendment-and-open-carry-of-guns-where-such-open-carry-is-legal/
[https://perma.cc/H8AQ-KB4K].
66. 529 U.S. 266, 268 (2000).
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Dade Police that a young black male standing at a particular bus
stop and wearing a plaid shirt was carrying a gun.”67 The
officers arrived at the scene and, apart from the tip, had no
reason to suspect any of the three waiting at the bus stop of
being involved in illegal conduct.68 The officers frisked J. L.
and seized an illegal gun from his pocket.69 The Supreme Court
held that “[u]nlike a tip from a known informant whose
reputation can be assessed and who can be held responsible if
her allegations turn out to be fabricated . . . ‘an anonymous tip
alone seldom demonstrates the informant’s basis of knowledge
or veracity.’”70 In JL, the Supreme Court made it clear that an
anonymous tip claiming a person is carrying a gun is not,
without more, sufficient to justify a police officer’s stop and
frisk of that person,71 but the Court, in dicta, did mention the
dangerous nature of firearms.72
However, that is not to say that any tip that is given to law
enforcement about an individual openly carrying a firearm will
be dismissed as insufficient to justify a stop. The reality is quite
the opposite as illustrated in Parker v. Chard.73
In Chard, Officers Chard and Illetschko “were dispatched
to investigate shoplifting allegations in Uptown Minneapolis.”74
“The manager said that a customer had approached another []
employee and pointed out several African American females
inside the store . . . claim[ing] to have seen them running out of
Victoria’s Secret.”75 “An employee there confirmed that a
‘group of black females’ had ‘very recently’ run out of the store,
but could not confirm whether any merchandise was stolen.”76
The officers did not believe Parker and her friends had stolen
any merchandise, noting the women never acted suspiciously;
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 270.
J.L., 529 U.S. at 268.
Id. at 272.
See 777 F.3d. 977, 981-82 (8th Cir. 2015).
Id. at 979.
Id.
Id.
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the officers searched Parker’s bags and, unsurprisingly, found
nothing stolen.77 Parker filed a civil rights lawsuit against the
officer for seizing her without reasonable suspicion.78 The
Eighth Circuit held that since “the tipster’s basis of knowledge
was not inside information but rather the observation of visible
activity . . . it was not clearly established that [Officers] Chard
and Illetschko—having corroborated the running asserted in the
eyewitness tip, and knowing shoplifting recently occurred—
could not reasonably suspect Parker of shoplifting.”79 Here, the
reliability of the tip was confirmed by the observation of the
visible activity by the witness as well as corroboration of the
part of the tip alleging suspicious activity.80
To put these principles into the context of the current Open
Carry Statute, an anonymous tip alleging only that an individual
is openly carrying a firearm in public is insufficient in and of
itself to develop reasonable suspicion because there are no
specific facts of criminality.81 Of course, nothing in the Fourth
Amendment prohibits officers from “responding to the call and
ascertaining through a consensual encounter whether [the
suspect] appear[s] dangerous.”82 But, until particularized facts
supporting a reasonable suspicion emerge, a stop of these
individuals is not allowed based solely on an anonymous tip that
they are carrying a firearm openly.83
The totality of the circumstances test allows for an officer
to draw on their own experiences and even legal activity can be
significant contributions in developing a reasonable suspicion.84
Looking to the Arkansas law, the legislatively-defined factors
are a good starting point for determining what circumstances
will play a role in deciding whether the officer has a reasonable

77. Id.
78. Chard, 777 F.3d at 980.
79. Id. at 981.
80. Id.
81. See Northrup v. City of Toledo Police Dep’t, 785 F.3d 1128, 1131-34 (6th Cir.
2015); United States v. Ubiles, 224 F.3d 213, 217-19 (3d Cir. 2000).
82. Northrup, 785 F.3d at 1133; see also infra Part III.B.
83. Northrup, 785 F.3d at 1133.
84. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968).
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suspicion.85 The fact that an individual is openly carrying a
firearm is very significant but, alone, cannot be dispositive in an
open carry state. However, the ambiguity within the statute and
lack of guidance of its current meaning have made these
questions significantly more complex than the average open
carry state.
The unique concern when dealing with the Open Carry
Statute evolves when officers use an individual’s obvious
possession of a firearm to search and seize individuals who
normally—if not carrying a visible firearm or weapon—would
not be subject to such Fourth Amendment intrusions.86 Take as
an example the recent case against Richard Chambless.
In May 2015, Richard Chambless was in Bald Knob,
Arkansas shopping between different stores while openly
carrying a pistol on his hip.87 As he stopped inside the local
McDonald’s to get a drink, Bald Knob Police arrived at the
scene and immediately arrested him for disorderly conduct and
carrying a weapon in violation of Ark. Code. Ann. § 5-73-120,
even though he was not acting unusual or violent.88 As he said,
“I was out shopping in town, stopped here to get a drink of water
carrying my weapon and went to jail for it.”89 Despite
arguments that he had been seized illegally, he was convicted of
both crimes and sentenced to “1 year probation, 15 days in jail,
and a $2,160 fine.”90 However, before he was able to appeal his
convictions, Attorney General Leslie Rutledge issued her
official opinion on the matter stating that open carry is legal in

85. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-81-203 (Repl. 2016).
86. See Akhil Reed Amar, Terry and Fourth Amendment First Principles, 72 ST.
JOHN’S L. REV. 1097, 1097-99 (1998).
87. Janelle Lilley & Marine Glisovic, UPDATE: Man Found Guilty After Being
Arrested for Open Carry in Bald Knob, KATV (Sept. 10, 2015),
http://katv.com/news/local/man-arrested-for-open-carry-in-bald-knob
[https://perma.cc/KPT7-PMUF].
88. Id.
89. Id.
90.
Id.; Curt Lanning, Bald Knob Open Carry Case Dismissed,
ARKANSASMATTERS.COM (Nov. 18, 2015), http://www.arkansasmatters.com/news/localnews/bald-knob-open-carry-case-dismissed/273686971 [https://perma.cc/9AL9-TALJ].
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Arkansas, and the case against Chambless was subsequently
dropped.91
Another similar example is James Tanner who recently
filed a civil lawsuit against the Arkansas State Police after his
concealed carry license was revoked.92 On November 29, 2014,
James Tanner, who at the time was a concealed carry license
holder, was openly carrying a handgun “while shopping at a
Wal-Mart in Searcy, Arkansas.”93 Arkansas State Trooper Kurt
Ziegenhorn, an out-of-uniform officer who noticed Tanner’s
open firearm, immediately approached Tanner “and demanded
that [he] provide identification.”94 Tanner refused to provide
any identification “and proceeded to leave.”95 Tanner was
arrested shortly thereafter and, interestingly, charged with
obstruction of governmental operations, but not with violating
the Carrying a Weapon Statute.96 Tanner was convicted and his
administrative appeal of the revocation of his concealed carry
license was unsuccessful.97
Arguments that his Fourth
Amendment rights had been violated by the illegal seizure were
immediately cast aside by the Pulaski County Circuit Court
Judge as “senseless.”98
Both of these cases illustrate how officers across the state
have handled encounters with openly carrying individuals. In
both instances, the officers seized and searched the individuals
without a warrant. Although it is unclear for certain exactly
what facts the officers relied upon in developing reasonable
suspicion or probable cause to conduct these searches and
seizures, what is readily apparent is that the visible firearm was

91. Lanning, supra note 90.
92. Lawsuit Viewed As Test of Arkansas’ Open-Carry Firearm Law, WASH. TIMES
(Jan.
24,
2016)
[hereinafter,
Lawsuit
Viewed
As
Test],
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/jan/24/lawsuit-viewed-as-test-of-arkansasopen-carry-fire/ [https://perma.cc/RP93-6DNZ].
93. Order Affirming Decision of Ark. State Police at 2, Tanner v. Ark. State Police,
No. 60CV-15-3197 (Ark. Cir. Ct. May 26, 2016).
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Lawsuit Viewed As Test, supra note 92.
97. Id.; Order Affirming Decision of Ark. State Police, supra note 93, at 1.
98. Order Affirming Decision of Ark. State Police, supra note 93, at 1, 6-7.
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a substantial factor—if not the only factor—in their decision to
investigate, detain, and ultimately arrest them.
This is a major concern advanced by the current Open
Carry Statute. The discretion of police officers to use seemingly
innocent facts to validate seizures and subsequent searches of an
individual is certainly not a new concept;99 however, the
distinguishing concern with this statute is that officers can use
the individual’s visible firearm as a substantial factor in support
of reasonable suspicion, a standard that has been diluted in favor
of neutralizing potentially dangerous suspects.100 These same
individuals, without carrying a firearm, would definitely not
have been subjected to such searches and seizures—or even
investigation at all—which is the problem perpetuated by the
lack of clarification and guidance from the legislature and the
Arkansas Judiciary, as well as, to some extent, the textual nature
of the statute itself. Furthermore, because police officers must
determine the mental state or “purpose” for which these
individuals are openly carrying their firearms, there is an
incentive for police officers to combine seemingly innocent facts
(e.g., late at night, high crime area, suspect’s demeanor, etc.) to
support any conclusions they may have drawn about the
individual. The potential for abuse is obvious, especially given
recent evidence illuminating the existence of racial profiling,
stopping, and frisking without cause by law enforcement
officials.101 Given the historical dilution and expansion of the
99. See United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 8 (1989); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S.
491, 502 (1983); Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 441 (1980); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22
(1968).
100. See Isaacs, supra note 44, at 387-93.
101. See David Rudovsky, Law Enforcement by Stereotypes and Serendipity: Racial
Profiling and Stops and Searches Without Cause, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 296, 303 (2001)
(“The powerful combination of governmental investigations, judicial findings, anecdotal
evidence, and statements by law enforcement officials leave little doubt about the existence
of racial profiling and other stops without cause.”); Anthony C. Thompson, Stopping the
Usual Suspects: Race and The Fourth Amendment, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 956, 956-65 (1999)
(arguing that Terry established a pattern of racially motivated searches, and offering a
variety of remedies to deter racially motivated searches and seizures); Angela J. Davis,
Race, Cops, and Traffic Stops, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 425, 425-27 (1997) (discussing the
discretionary nature of pre-textual stops and their discriminatory effect on AfricanAmericans and Latinos); MATTHEW R. DUROSE, ERICA L. SMITH & PATRICK A. LANGAN,
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STAT., CONTACTS BETWEEN POLICE AND
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original limited holding of Terry,102 coupled with the seemingly
unlimited number of innocent facts that can establish reasonable
suspicion, individuals who openly carry a firearm in Arkansas
are essentially providing police with substantial support—if not
complete justification—for seizing and searching their person.

B. Consensual Encounter
The second type of police-citizen interaction is the
consensual encounter.
Under the Consensual Encounter
Doctrine, the Supreme Court has upheld substantial investigative
questioning by armed police officers without any objective
indication of criminality, so long as a reasonable person would
feel free to leave.103
The seminal case outlining this concept is United States v.
Mendenhall.104
In Mendenhall, the defendant, Sylvia
Mendenhall, arrived at the Detroit Metropolitan Airport on a
commercial airline flight from Los Angeles.105
As she
106
disembarked, she was observed by two DEA agents.
After
observing the defendant’s conduct, which appeared to be
characteristic of persons unlawfully carrying narcotics, the
agents approached her in the concourse, identified themselves as
federal agents, and asked to see her identification and airline
ticket.107 The agents noticed that the name on the defendant’s
ticket was different from the name on her identification.108
When the agents questioned Mendenhall, she “became quite
shaken, extremely nervous . . . [and] [s]he had a hard time
speaking.”109
PUBLIC,
2005
(2007),
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpp05.pdf
[https://perma.cc/X8E5-ZRXH].
102. See Isaacs, supra note 44, at 387.
103. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 555 (1980); Daniel J. Steinbock,
The Wrong Line Between Freedom and Restraint: The Unreality, Obscurity, and Incivility
of the Fourth Amendment Consensual Encounter Doctrine, 38 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 507,
509-10 (2001); see also Volokh, supra note 65.
104. See Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 546-47.
105. Id. at 547.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 547-48.
108. Id. at 548.
109. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 548.
THE
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After she was subsequently arrested, the defendant argued
on appeal of her conviction that the agents’ conduct was not a
permissive stop under the standards of Terry.110 The Court
concluded “that a person has been ‘seized’ within the meaning
of the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all of the
circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person
would have believed that he was not free to leave;” and
therefore, since no seizure of the defendant actually took place,
the agents’ conduct did not amount to an intrusion upon any
constitutionally protected interest.111
Some factors to be
considered in determining if a reasonable person would have felt
free to leave include the number of officers present, the display
of a weapon, physical contact between the officer and citizen,
and the officer’s language and tone of voice.112
California v. Hodari D. expanded this construct by adding
a new element to the Mendenhall test.113 In Hodari D., the
Court held that a seizure does not occur until either the
individual actually submits to the show of authority of the
officer, or the officer applies physical force.114
Information
developed
during
these
consensual
encounters—or even the attempt to avoid or resist them—can
give rise to reasonable suspicion for a stop.115 Many times,
because the officer has untethered discretion to ask any
questions she or he deems appropriate, including requesting
consent to search the individual, “it is not uncommon for a
consensual encounter to lead directly to probable cause to
arrest.”116
The typical concern of both individuals and law
enforcement agencies alike, when dealing with the Open Carry
Statute, revolves around the officer’s authority when in the

110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
559-60.
116.

Id. at 549-50.
Id. at 554-55.
Id. at 554.
See California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 627-29 (1991).
Id. at 629 (considering a chase by a clearly identifiable police officer).
Steinbock, supra note 103, at 520; see also Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 547-49,
Steinbock, supra note 103, at 520.
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presence of an individual openly carrying a firearm in public.117
Because the Fourth Amendment is not even implicated in
consensual encounters, law enforcement officers essentially
have unlimited discretion to investigate these individuals so long
as no constitutional search or seizure occurs.
The troubling issue arises again in that, just as illuminated
by the low standard of investigative Terry stops, consensual
encounters require no justification by the officer at all; the only
way any Fourth Amendment protections arise is if a reasonable
person would feel free to disregard the officer’s demand,118 or if
they actually submit to the officer’s show of authority.119 Else,
the Fourth Amendment has no application. This unhindered
discretion is fundamentally eroding the Fourth Amendment
rights of openly carrying, law-abiding citizens. Citizens who
openly carry a firearm in Arkansas can, and will, be investigated
by law enforcement officers even though they are technically
not violating any law.120 Just as in Tanner and Chambless’
cases, the simple fact that they were openly carrying a firearm
was the reason that officers initiated their investigation (and
likely their arrest).121
In essence, by not violating the law, individuals openly
carrying are effectively encouraging, if not requiring, law
enforcement officers to inquire and explore their person through
consensual encounters, which are by their very nature used as a
tool for police to initiate investigations of crime and ultimately
lead to arrests.122 And, of course, once these encounters ensue,
the low standard of reasonable suspicion—distilled by the fact
that the individual possesses a firearm—is all the officer needs
117. See Sheriff’s Office Opposes Open Carry of Handguns, PINE BLUFF COMM.,
(Oct. 13, 2015, 4:05 AM), http://pbcommercial.com/news/local/sheriff-s-office-opposesopen-carry-handguns [https://perma.cc/RP7L-VRC9].
118. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 436 (1991).
119. California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 629 (1991); Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at
555; Steinbock, supra note 103, at 515-16.
120. See Suit Viewed As Test of State’s Open-Carry Law, TEXARKANA GAZETTE
(Jan. 25, 2016), http://www.texarkanagazette.com/news/arkansas/story/2016/jan/25/suitviewed-test-states-open-carry-law/414170/ [https://perma.cc/D7MV-K4CY].
121. See Lilley & Glisovic, supra note 87; Order Affirming Decision of Ark. State
Police, supra note 93, at 2.
122. Steinbock, supra note 103, at 520.
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to seize the weapon and the person, as well as search the person
and his or her immediate surroundings.123

IV. SEARCHING FOR A SOLUTION
A. Arkansas Supreme Court
A judicial interpretation of this statute is needed. As of the
writing of this article, the Arkansas Supreme Court has yet to
address the Open Carry Statute head-on, and the state continues
to be torn in every direction in handling these situations.124
Indeed, each county in the state is treating this statute differently
and it is impossible, as a threshold matter, to understand exactly
what to do with an offense.125 A potential solution to this
problem lies with the Arkansas Supreme Court. It is essential
that the judicial system interpret the Open Carry Statute and
determine if Arkansas really does allow for open carry. By
making an affirmative ruling on the newly revised statute, the
Supreme Court could calm at least some of the tension
reverberating throughout the state.126

B. Arkansas General Assembly
The legislature, by changing this law and allowing for open
carry, has inadvertently opened the door for law enforcement to
use their discretion in both consensual and Terry encounters and
to engage in investigations of persons openly carrying firearms
with little—if any—legal restrictions. All that is required of law
enforcement officers is to develop reasonable suspicion that
such individual has or is about to commit a crime.127 After the
officers develop reasonable suspicion, they have the authority to
conduct a seizure of the individual, and subsequently search that

123. ARK. R. CRIM. P. 3.4.
124. Tom Henry, “Open Carry” Confusion, BLYTHEVILLE COURIER NEWS (June
23, 2015), http://www.blythevillecourier.com/story/2207419.html [https://perma.cc/LBK8FSV4].
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. See Hill v. State, 275 Ark. 71, 79, 628 S.W.2d 284, 288 (1982); see also Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968).
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person.128 This is especially problematic when the individual is
in their vehicle, where reasonable suspicion is all that is needed
to search the passenger compartment of an automobile when
dealing with the safety of police officers on duty.129
This problem presents a major concern with the new
statute. The legislature has opened up the doors for law
enforcement to investigate, stop, and frisk individuals who are
openly carrying a firearm, and any additional evidence that the
officers obtain from these searches is admissible against the
individual, including evidence of unrelated crimes.130 Because
officers enjoy great discretion, especially when a dangerous
weapon is present, it is a natural progression that the
accumulation of these interactions will cause tension between
communities and their law enforcement departments.
Furthermore, this discretion, through the current framework of
the Fourth Amendment, significantly erodes the fundamental
constitutional protections afforded to all citizens of this state. It
is imperative that the Arkansas General Assembly provide
clarifications on what exactly these revisions mean. Does Ark.
Code Ann. § 5-73-120 definitively make this state an open carry
state? Is this exactly what the 2013 revisions intended? May
anyone openly carry a firearm? These are the questions that the
state desperately needs definitive answers to. The citizens of
this state deserve concrete answers from the Arkansas General
Assembly.

V. PROPOSAL FOR A REVISED STATUTE
Considering the current legal framework of the Fourth
Amendment, especially the nature and extent of law
enforcement’s expansive legal capability under Terry stop and
frisks and consensual encounters, the Arkansas Open Carry
128. Terry, 392 U.S. at 30-31.
129. See Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 144-46 (1972).
130. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465 (1971) (holding that there
are certain circumstances when a warrantless seizure by police of an item that comes
within plain view during their lawful search of a private area may be reasonable under the
Fourth Amendment); see also Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 326 (1987) (holding that
probable cause is required to invoke the “plain view” doctrine).
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Statute erodes fundamental protections of law-abiding citizens,
and therefore must be re-written or completely discarded. The
concerns of officer discretion raised in these citizen-police
encounters inevitably lead to a deterioration of citizens’ rights,
and without concrete clarification of statutory intent, the lack of
guidance is costing law-abiding citizens of Arkansas their
constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures.
Furthermore, because the current text of the Arkansas Open
Carry Statute is ambiguous and has caused a significant amount
of confusion, this article proposes that a revision to this statute
would provide more clarification and would greatly reduce the
erosion of Fourth Amendment protections perpetuated by an
unclear and difficult statute. There are many states that have
functioning open carry statutes.131 However, there are many
different state approaches to open carry such as prohibiting long
guns,132 requiring permits to openly carry,133 or prohibiting
handguns while allowing for the open carry of long guns.134
Understanding that there is no one perfect way, there are many
other states that allow for open carry through a more effective
statutory scheme that does not perpetuate the erosion of
individual Fourth Amendment protections.
Arizona is famous for some of the most lenient approaches
when it comes to gun laws.135 The statutory scheme in Arizona
allows for any adult person who is not a “prohibited possessor”
to openly carry a loaded firearm visible to others.136 Arizona’s
131. See Joshua Gillin, There Are 45 States That Allow Open Carry for Firearms,
Former NRA President Says, POLITIFACT (Nov. 18, 2015, 5:26 PM),
http://www.politifact.com/florida/statements/2015/nov/18/marion-hammer/there-are-45states-allow-open-carry-handguns-form/ [https://perma.cc/HWF7-JBJ3]; Open Carrying,
LAW CTR. TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE, http://smartgunlaws.org/open-carrying-policysummary/ [https://perma.cc/U2RD-322K].
132. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 26400 (West 2013); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 790.053
(West 2011).
133. See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 571.037 (2013); OKLA. STAT. TIT. 21, § 1289.6
(2012); V.T.C.A. § 46.02 (West 2016).
134. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-23-20 (2014).
135. Matthew Hartvigsen, 10 States with the Most Lenient Gun Laws, DESERET
NEWS (Apr. 8, 2013, 9:37 AM), http://www.deseretnews.com/top/1429/8/Arizona-10states-with-the-most-lenient-gun-laws-.html [https://perma.cc/KZ32-FFTA].
136. ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 13-3101(A)(7), 3102 (2016).
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open carry law is different from Arkansas’s current Open Carry
Statute in a number of ways. First and foremost, there is no
requirement—or even mention—of intent to use a weapon
unlawfully in Arizona’s Misconduct Involving Weapons
statute.137 This contrasts starkly against Arkansas’s Open Carry
Statute because it de-incentivizes law enforcement investigation,
while the intent requirement of Arkansas’s Open Carry Statute
actually encourages, if not requires, officer investigation.
Without any mental state requirement, Arizona is effectively
deterring police investigation of these presumably law-abiding
citizens—placing them on the same playing field as any person
not carrying a firearm—thereby reducing the need for officer
discretion and, inevitably, the erosion of Fourth Amendment
protections.
Another contrast with Arizona’s Misconduct Involving
Weapons statute—one that is readily apparent—is the clarity,
consistency, and relative ease in understanding the statute,
which Arkansas’s current statute lacks. With little ambiguity,
Arizona’s clear approval of open carry allows for law
enforcement departments across the state to develop consistent
policies when dealing with police-citizen encounters involving
individuals who are openly carrying firearms.138 By following
Arizona’s statutory construction of their open carry laws,
Arkansas will make huge strides towards resolving the
controversy, concern, and misunderstandings that have plagued
open carry in this state since Act 746’s textual revisions.
Therefore, if the Arkansas legislature intends for this state
to be an open carry state, they should, for example, adopt a
statutory construction of the Carrying a Weapon Statute similar
to that of Arizona’s139 to read:

137. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-3102 (West 2016).
138. See Robert Farago, Open Carry Interaction with the Police: A Law
Enforcement
Perspective,
THETRUTHABOUTGUNS.COM
(Mar.
21,
2014),
http://www.thetruthaboutguns.com/2014/03/robert-farago/open-carry-interaction-with-thepolice-a-law-enforcement-perspective/ [https://perma.cc/4T25-4XFZ].
139. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-3102.

164

ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70:139

(a) A person commits the offense of carrying a
weapon by knowingly possessing a handgun, knife, or
club on or about his person:
(1) in furtherance of a serious offense or during the
commission of any felony;
(2) if such person is prohibited from possessing such
weapon; or
(3) if entering any establishment where possession of
such weapon is unauthorized, unless otherwise
specifically authorized by law.
With this statutory scheme, the Arkansas Legislature will
be able to determine who is allowed to openly carry a firearm
and where such possession is legal. By replacing the current
ambiguous language of the Arkansas statute in this manner, the
state will definitively and unambiguously become an open carry
state by removing any penalty for openly carrying a firearm
unless one of these characterizations apply. Of course, the
Legislature can and should delineate which persons are
prohibited from possessing such firearms and should develop
laws that specifically outline the requirements for possession of
firearms in restricted areas.

VI. CONCLUSION
It is essential that Arkansas citizens are educated about the
law and understand how law enforcement agencies will be
handling these situations going forward. Those who do carry
openly should be aware that officers have an expansive
capability to investigate individuals who are carrying firearms.
By openly carrying a firearm in Arkansas, you are, in effect,
providing law enforcement officials with another substantial
factor to contribute to the development of reasonable suspicion
that you are engaged in criminal activity, a factor that is
determinatively against you. The current form of the Arkansas
Open Carry Statute must be revised. By considering the
expansive discretion of police officers in both Terry stop and
frisk scenarios as well as consensual encounters, it is clear that
the present construction of the statute will continue to erode
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Fourth Amendment protections of law-abiding citizens who are
openly carrying firearms in public. It is up to the courts and the
legislature to provide clarity and to revise the statute accordingly
to prevent the continuation of this injustice against liberty.
J. HARRISON BERRY

